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| Registros recuperados: 12 | |
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| Coggins, Jay S.; Ramezani, Cyrus A.. |
| In the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility, dynamic decision problems should not be solved using expected net present value analysis. The right to delay a decision can be valuable. We show that the value of this right equals Arrow and Fishers (1974) quasi-option value. In a discrete model we show how to derive quasi-option value using methods from finance, methods that remove altogether the need to take expected values of future stochastic variables. Two main findings are presented. First, if the stochastic dynamic process underlying the problem is known, the Arrow and Fisher and Henry (1974) result that improper use of net present value leads to too much early development, is correct. Second, if the process is not known perfectly, their... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14469 |
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| Coggins, Jay S.; Graham-Tomasi, Theodore; Roe, Terry L.. |
| Governments often establish economic policy in response to political pressure by interest groups. Since these groups' political activities may alter prices, economies so affected cannot be characterized by perfect competition. We develop a model of a "lobbying economy" in which consumers' choice of political activity simultaneously determines relative prices and income levels. They balance the loss in income due to lobbying payments against the potential gain in wealth from a favorable government price policy. This paper proves the existence of an equilibrium in economies of this sort. We reformulate the economy as a generalized lobbying game and prove the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium in the game. This equilibrium is then shown to be an... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Rent seeking; Generalized game; Lobbying equilibrium; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 1988 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7468 |
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| Qi, Shunrong; Coggins, Jay S.; Xu, Lan. |
| The paper provides a methodology that is feasibly implemented for integrated environmental-economic (or 'green') GDP accounting and productivity measurement. The shadow prices for environmental inputs, which enable us to calculate green GDP and to design a pollution tax scheme and tradable permit system for social optimum, can be derived. The development of the statistics of green GDP and green productivity growth provides a fundamental component of policy-making for socially optimal growth and of formulating the market mechanisms for environmental management. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Productivity Analysis. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20682 |
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| Coggins, Jay S.. |
| When economic actors are also allowed to become politically active, perhaps to influence a government price policy, they face decision problems with essentially simultaneous political and economic features. If, in addition, two groups struggle to pull the administered price level in opposite directions, an important strategic component is introduced. On two levels, then, such situations depart from the competitive economy framework of Arrow and Debreu. The model of this paper is designed to reconcile the general equilibrium model with politically active interest groups. This model is then used to assess the welfare consequences of such lobbying activity. We find that very often a lobbying program with price distortions is not the best means for regulating... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Lobbying behavior; Rent-seeking; Distortionary policy.; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 1989 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7463 |
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| Johansson, Robert C.; Coggins, Jay S.; Senauer, Benjamin. |
| Higher union density (the percentage of employees in an area who belong to unions) is known to raise the wages of union members. We find that in the supermarket industry, higher density locally also leads to higher wages for non-union members. Despite this, workers who are not in unions lose ground relative to union members. For a 10% increase in local union densities in the supermarket industry it is estimated that the wages of union employees in that labor market will increase by 5.3% and by 1.2% for nonunion. Hence, the union wage premium will increase in regions with higher union densities. At the time of the last national examination of the retail industry in 1977, union influence in the retail food industry was near its peak. Subsequently union... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; Labor and Human Capital; Marketing. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14313 |
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| Konishi, Yoshifumi; Coggins, Jay S.. |
| Little theoretical work has been done previously on the welfare valuation of changes in price and quality when consumers are imperfectly informed. The presence of imperfect information is particularly important in the analysis of averting behaviors. We develop a theoretical welfare measure, called quasi-compensating variation, as a natural extension of compensating variation (CV). We show that this welfare measure offers not only a money metric of the "value of information", but also a means to appropriately evaluate the welfare effects of various policies when consumers are imperfectly informed of water contamination. With a numerical example and our decomposition results (Propositions 2 and 3), we demonstrate that (i) the value of information could... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Consumer/Household Economics. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21395 |
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| Registros recuperados: 12 | |
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